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Database security is a major concern for the database designer, the database should be
protected against improper disclosure of sensitive infonnatlon and unauthorized user .
•
Mandatory security and disrectionary security are the two categories of database security.
Mandatory security restricts access to classified infonnatlon to cleared personnel, and
I
remains static during database operations~ the database that supports mandatory security
-"'
is called multilevel secure database. On the other hand, disrectionary security control
access to data on the basis of identity of users, type of access, and the speci fic object
being accessed.
Database is a vital commodity in both government and industry. The parallel
evolution of multilevel security (MLS) and database management systems (DBMS) has
revolutionized the way infonnation is stored, protected, and accessed. Starting in the
past decade, a major research effort was undertaken with the goal of merging and
integrating multilevel security with database technology. This new area of research
generated much progress in the following years in developing mechanisms to ensure
greater security in these systems.
The multi level secure relational database model introduces the concepts of security
clearance levels for both data and users. Data stored in the database are tagged with
different security classifications level based upon the sensitivity of data. Security
clearance levels are also issued to database users, and users may not access data unless
their security level exceed the security level associated with the data.
Multilevel secure (MLS) relations exist only at the logical level, in reality, MLS
relations are decomposed into a collection of single-level base relations which are then
physically stored in the database. The MLS relations are reconstructed from these base
relations on user demand. There are several advantages of decomposing MLS relation
into a collection of single-level base relations. The primary advantage is to enforce
mandatory controls with respect to single-level base relations. The Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) IS responsible for enforcing mandatory controls with respect to single-level
base relation, TCB is a small part of the operating system that must always be invoked,
and must be shown to perform only its intended functions.
There have been several efforts to build a multilevel secure (MLS) relational database
models. A major issues is how to decompose a multilevel secure relation into single
level secure relation that will be stored physically in the database. The Proposals have
ranged from decomposing a MLS relation based on attribute classification [Lunt, 90],
decomposing a MiS relation based on tuples classification [Jajo,91], to decomposing a
MLS relation based on views and fragments [Pem, 91].
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SeaView model [Lunt, 90] decomposes a MLS relation into a collection of single
level secure base relations using horizontal and vertical fragmentation. The
reconstruction of MLS relation requires a repeated expensive join operations. Novel
[Jajo,91a] decomposes MLS relation using horizontal fragmentation into single level
relations. The base relations are large which requires large va that reduce the
perfonnance, Furthennore, Novel model, has a large storage overhead during updating
operations. A new decomposition technique is required that minimize number ofjoin
operations and create a base relation that are relatively small compares to Novel model.
The goal of this research is to reconcile and unify the differences among several
decomposition techniques, and to develop a new decomposition technique to decompose
a MLS relation into single level secure relations.
The thesis is organized as follows:
* Chapter 2 presents a review of related research which has influence the thesis
research, this chapter discusses several security models in detail and their advantages
and disadvantages, it also discusses integrity and polyinstantion issues in detail.
* Chapter 3 provides the New decomposition and Recovery algorithm. Moreover,
chapter 3 demonstrates how the New decomposition and Recovery algorithm works with
an example and discusses the result. Finally thi.s chapter perform an analytical
comparison among several decomposition techniques based on Space and Time
complexity.




The significant development of information technology in recent decades has lead to
the widespread use of computer systems in virtually all private as well as public
organizations such as banks, universities, libraries, utility companies, military, etc. The
increasing availability of the computer systems at lower costs, coupled with the more
reliable software and hardware technologies, have all encouraged the widespread use of
computing services. As a result more data than ever before is now stored and managed
by computer systems [ Kang, 95].
A database is a collection of permanent data, managed by the DataBase Management
System (DBMS). DBMSs were designed to organize and maintain large amount of
information in an efficient and effective manner so that the data can be made available as
quickly as possible when requested [Mark, 96J.
Although the widespread use of database has proved necessary to support business
function, it has also posed serious problems of data security. As a result while DBMSs
were developing and matching, a parallel development occurred in the maturing of
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computer security policy. Computer security policy deals with those aspects of
information security policy that applied or contained within the computer system.
Traditionally the following broad objectives applied to computer system: availability,
integrity, and security.
AVAILABILITY is concerned with denial of service. It means preventing /
detecting /deterring improper denial of access to services provided by the system
[Hamm,93]. For example, in military environment, when proper command is issued, the
missile should fire. Analogously, in commercial environment, payment orders regarding
taxes should be made on time as fixed by law.
INTEGRITY is concerned with preventing the unauthorized modification or
destruction of information or data. There are three types of integrity: object, access, and
data. Object integrity deals with network transmissions and program libraries; Access
integrity is the counterpart of security as it is concerned with which users are authorized
to change information in the system; and data integrity deals with the correctne s of
information in the database context [Date, 90). Since the integrity concept is crucial for
any database security model, a complete section will be devoted to this topic in the
l.i terature review.
SECURITY is a system of safeguards designed to protect data and information from
intentional or accidental access by unauthorized person. Before the widespread use of
computer systems, security of information was provided through a set of rules and
procedures for marking and controlling information in the fonn of printed material s.
These rules and procedures were include labeling documents in accordance with the
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security required for their handling. A simple security hierarchy was developed with
four classification of increasing level of security. The level from lowest to highest are:
Unclassified (U), Confidential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS). A document is given
an overall classification, such as Top Secret and individual are also given classification
that can not be higher than overall classification [Thur, 95].
This simple security hierarchy has been adopted to computer systems with many of
its original concept intact. Information in a computer system is required to be labeled
with its security classification. Users of the information are then required to have the
proper clearance level to access the data in the system. Then the secure computer system
compares the clearance of the users to the classification of the information and mediate
the access of the users to the data in accordance with the security rules. For example, a
basic security procedure is that no user can read any information with a greater
classification than the user has, a confidential user can not have access to secret and top
secret information [ Hwan, 97] .
Many computer systems run at only one security level. System may run as top secret,
meaning that all users are cleared at the same level of top secret, even though the
information may be of any level ( U, C, S). The infonnation are treated as top secret, and
users are trusted to change the level of output information to the appropriate level such as
unclassified, etc. This approach to security is not only inefficient, but also is very costly.
To apply such a system, all users must be cleared to the highest level of clearance, and
all information are entered into the system as if they were at the highest level.
Theoretically, a computer can be prohlTammed to distinguish among users and
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infonnation in such a manner that one can provide for a range of needs. System which
provides this procedure, that is, have more than one security level of classification is
called Multilevel Security System. Multilevel Security System deals with the computer
system that contains information with a variety of classification and has some users who
are not cleared for the highest classification of data that contained in the system
[Qian,97].
Multilevel secure database is intended to provide the security needed for database
systems that contain data at a variety of classification, and serves a set of users having
different clearance [Pesa, 97J. As a result, there have been several efforts to design
multilevel secure relational database models. The following chapter discusses several
security models such as Bell- LaPadule model, SeaView model, LDV model, MLR
model, Pemul model, Chinese Wall Lattice model.
The Bell-LaPadule model (BLP)
Bell and LaPadule model [Bell, 75] is a fonnal mathematical model which specifies
the requirements for a secure computer system. The model defines three entities, users (
human being and is recognized by a unique identity), subject (program in execution that
is associated with one user), and object ( files, data, etc.). the model provides a simple
mechanism for mediating the access of subjects to objects. A security violation occurs
when an object is returned to a subject who either has a clearance lower than object in
question, or the subject does not have the need-to-know assigned to object [Bell, 75J
Bell-LaPadule model enlarges disrectionary access control with mandatory access
control to enforce infonnation flow. Both discretionary and mandatory access must
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authorize the operation before the operation is carried out. Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) is expressed by a discretionary access matrix M, whose contents can be modified
by the subject. On the other hand, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is expressed by
security labels for the objects and security clearance for the subjects, the user has no
control over the mandatory access rules. More specifically, for security to be maintained,
two properties must be hold [Lin, 93].
1- Simple-security property: NO READ UP !
Subject s can read object 0 only if A (s) ~ A (0).
2- * property: NO WRITE DOWN 1
Subjects can write object 0 only if A (s) ~ A (0).
A signifying the security label of the indicated subject or object.
The first rule prohibits a program running at an confidential level from reading
infonnation from a secret object and the second rule prohibits a program running at a
secret level from writing to confidential objects even it is pennitted to do so by the
discretionary access controls. Information is allowed to flow from bottom to top. BLP
prevents infonnation flow between security classes, but it does not prevent infonnation
flow between similar security classes[Lin, 93].
A curious aspect of* property is that an unclassified subject can write a secret file.
This means that secret files can be destroyed by unclassified subjects. To prevent this
problem, a modified * property is sometime used that requires A (s) = A (0) that is
subjects can write at their own level but can not write up[Lin, 93].
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The advantage of BLP model is that it formalize the concept of mandatory access
controls and discretionary access controls to enforce information flow policies.
The disadvantage ofBLP model is that, the Mandatory Access Controls only prevent
information flows between security classes and do not prevent information flows
between same security classes. Mandatory controls do not solve the Trojan horse
problems. Trojan horse software performs normal functions expected by its user, but
also engages in unauthorized activities to undermine security.
SeaView Mode)
The SeaView model [Lunt, 90] was developed as a prototype of a Multilevel Secure
Database Management System based on view mechanism. The model governs access to
the data stored in the database on the basis of mandatory as well as discretionary policies.
The model is formulated in two layered: Mandatory Access Control model (MAC) and
the Trusted computing Base (TCB).
The Mandatory Access Control model defines the mandatory security policy which
states that users mav not have access to data unless their security levels exceed the
security levels associated with the data. In other words, the users have the requisite
secrecy and integrity authorization for the information, based on information
classification [Lunt,93].
The MAC model assigns two access classes to each subject S: read-classeS) and
write-class (S), where read-class(S) >= write-class (S). The access requirements are
formalized by the following rules [Lunt, 88]:
a) A subject S can read data of access class conly if read-class (S) >= c, and
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b) A subject S can write data of access class c only if write-class (S) <= c.
The Trusted Computed Base defines the discretionary access control policy and the
supporting policies; it specifies the component of multilevel secure relational database
system, including multilevel secure relations, snapshots, views, relational expression,
integrity constraints, and discretionary authorization. TeB model also defines the
multilevel secure relations and formalizes policies for labeling new and derived data,
transaction consistency, and discretionary security [ Denn, 88].
The SeaView Decomposition Technique was initiate by SeaView model in 1988.
SeaView decomposes a relation into partitions using vertical and horizontal
fragmentation. The decomposition is based on classification of attributes of the
relation, all attributes with the same classification are grouped together to fonn a single
level relation, each relation is labeled with a single classification and then physically
stored in the database. The underlying trusted computed base enforces the mandatory
controls with respect to the single level base relation. The multilevel secure relation i
reconstructed by performing a repeated join operation. [Lunt, 90].
SeaView model has produced the first design for a multilevel secure database system
that allow users to obtain data they are cleared for from systems that also contain data
clarified higher than their clearance. Furthermore, SeaView has provided the first
interpretation of database integrity in the context ofmultiJevel security, by requiring that
database integrity hold with respect to the subset of the database visible at any security
level. SeaView also introduce the notion of polyinstantiation, which prevent low level
users from inferring the existence of high data objects [Jajo, 90).
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However, the reconstruction of a multilevel secure relation required a number of
repeated joins operations. The join operations are very expensive operations and the
reconstruction would lead to a bad performance if a large number of joins is involved.
Moreover, the SeaView decomposition and reconstruction leads to a set of Spurious
tuples ( tuples exist after the reconstruction but didn't exist before the decomposition);
however, SeaView method provides an algorithm to remove the spurious tuples
[Mukk,94].
The SeaView Decomposition Algorithm decomposes a multilevel secure relation
into single level base relations [Loot, 88].
The following Notations will be used for all algorithms:
R: multilevel secure relation, n: number of attributes in relation R
Al : primary key, Cl : classification of primary key
Ai: data attribute, i={2,3, ... ,n}, Ci: classification attribute for Ai.
TC: Tuple-level classification, TC = Least upper bound { Ci, i= 1,2,3, ... , n).
Least upper bound: Let a and b two elements in a partially ordered set (A, ~). An
element c is said to be an upper bound of a and b if a $ c and b $ c. An element
c is said to be a least upper bound of a and b if c is an upper bound of a and b, and
if there is no other upper bound d of a and b such that d $ c [Liu,87].
A binary relation from set A to A is said to be a binary relation on A.
A partial ordering relation M is a binary relation that is reflexive, antisymrnetric, and
transitive. A partially ordered set is a partial ordering relation together with set A.
A binary relation M on A is said to be a reflexive relation if (a,a) is in M for every a in A.
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A binary relation M on A is said to be an antisymmetric relation if(a, b) is in M implies
that (b, a) is not in M unless a = b.
A binary relation M on A is said to be a transitive relation if(a, c) is in M whenever
both (a, b) and (b, c) are in M.
Ll : lowest level in the security classification, HI: highest level.
R l,c and R2,c: base relations with classification c, c E { U, C, S, TS }.L1 : lowest level
in the security classification, HI: highest level.
R1,c : Primary group base relations with classification c.
Ri,c : Attribute group base relations with classification c.
Input: A multilevel secure relation.
Output: A collection of single level base relations.
1) Primary Key Group Relations:
\j c E {U, C, S, TS] create: Rl,c (AI)
2 ) Attribute Group Relations:
For i = 2,... , n
with class c.
\j C E (U, C, S, TS }
create: Ri,c ( AI, C 1, Ai ) with class c.
End
The SeaView Recovery Algorithm reconstructs a multilevel secure relation from its
single-level base relations[Lunt, 88] :
Notations:
PI,c: represent the derived relation ( derived from (R 1,c) )
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Pi,c : represent the derived relation (derived from (Ri,c»
Input: A collection of single level base relations
Output A multilevel secure relation.
Pl,c = (AI,CI=c)
For = 2 to n
v C E (U, C, S, TS }
Pi,c = ( K,CIA-i, c)
End
v C E (U, C, S, TS }
Pi = Pi.U U Pi,C U Pi.S U Pi,TS
End
R = (Pi JOIN P2 JOIN P3, ... JOIN Pn) [Lunt, 88].
The following example shows how the decomposition and the recovery techniques
works in SeaView. The multilevel secure relation in table 1 will be decomposed into
single base relations which are stored physically in the database. Table 1 will be used
in the SeaView, Novel, and New decomposition techniques.
EMPLOYEE CI NAME C2 JOB C3 BDATE C4 SALARY C5 TC
NUMBER
555 S DAVID S MANAGER S 02·10-{;7 S S65,OOO TS IS
333 S OMER S SPY IS 12-19-55 S S69.000 IS TS
~3J S OlvlER S JANIIOR S 12-19-55 S S20,OOO S S
666 IS NmcE IS PRESIDENT IS 10·28-45 TS $99,000 TS T5
666 5 SONIA S SECRETARY S 05-D5-48 S $28,000 S S
444 S ALI S spy TS 02-19-65 TS $75,000 TS TS
444 S ALl S SALESMAN S OJ -20-60 S S35.000 5 5
Table I' MUl.Tll.EVEL SECURE RELAnON (R)
IJ
The SeaView decomposition example, the algorithm decomposes the MLS
relation in Table 1 into the following single level base relations. The follo\-ving example
shows how the decomposition techniques works in SeaView. The multilevel secure
relation in table 1 will be decomposed into single base relations which are stored
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R2, TS
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The SeaView Recovery example, the algorithm constructs the multilevel secure
relation R from its single level secure base relations.
P i = R l.s URI,IS
555
333









P2 = R1,s U R2. IS
555 S DAVID S
333 S OMER S
666 S SONAr S
444 S ALI S
R2,s




555 S DAVID S
333 S OMER S
666 S SONIA S
444 S ALI S
666 TS MIKE TS
P2
P3 = R3,s U RJ.TS
555 S MA.\jAGER S
333 S JAmTOR S
666 S SECRETARY S
444 S SALES,\.iA.\j S
R3, S
P4 = R4,s U R4. TS
u
333 5 Spy TS
666 T5 PRESIDENT TS
444 S SPY TS
RJ,TS
555 S MAJ'IAGER S
333 S JAmTOR s
666 S SECRETARY S
444 S SALESMA..\I S
333 S Spy TS
666 TS PRESIDENT TS
444 S SPY TS
P3
555 S 2-10-67 5
333 S 12-19-55 5
666 S 05-05- 48 5
444 S 01-20-60 S
R4, S
u 666 TS 10-28-45 TS
444 5 02-19-65 T5
R4,TS
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555 S 2-10-67 5
333 5 12-19-55 S
666 5 05-05- 48 S
444 5 01-20-60 5
666 1S 10-28-45 T5
444 5 02-19-65 TS
P4
P5 = R5,s U R5,TS
R5,TS
333 S 20,000 S
666 S 28,000 S
444 S 35,000 S
R5,s
u
555 S 65,000 TS
333 S 69,000 TS
666 TS 99,000 TS
444 S 75,000 TS
333 S 20,000 S
666 S 28,000 S
444 S 35,000 S
555 S 65,000 TS
333 S 69,000 TS
666 TS 99,000 TS
444 S 75,000 TS
P5
R = P J JOIN P2 JOIN P3 JOIN P4 JOIN P5
The result is the original multilevel secure relation R ( table I).
LOCK Data Views
LOCK Data Views [Stac, 90] is a multilevel secure relational database model that is
builds on the security policies for operating system. LOCK Data View (LDV) is
designed to run on SCTC's (LOCK) Trusted Computing Base (TCB). SCTC's LOCK
has been designed to provide control in tenns of abstract entities and operations which
reflect an operating system policy. Access to data is controlled by LOCK and
information in the database are stored in single level file. LOCK ensures that these
database files may be opened for read/write operations only by subjects executing at the
appropriate levels [Stac, 90].
17
LDV Security Policy consists of a mandatory security policy and a discretionary
security policy. The mandatory security provides a multilevel control policy which
addresses both access to data and the flow of infonnation in the system, whi Ie the
discretionary security policy enforces the need to know structure [Haig, 91].
LDY allows individuals posses a rang of clearance to create, share, and manipulate
relational databases, that is a subject is allowed to access an object only if the subject
security level is more than or equal the object security level. There are three principal
entities in the LOY security policy, subject, object, and Effective Access Matrix (EAM).
Subjects are the active process-like entities, the objects are the passive file-like
entities, and the EAM defines the permissible flows of information within the system
[Haig, 91].
The LOY enforces the security policies by three assured pipelines. The pipel1nes
are a set of communication processes each of which could be verified separately. The
three pipelines are 1) the response pipeline 2) the update pipeline, and 3), the rnetadata
pipeline. The response pipeline maps a query from the application domains to the
database, processes the query to produce a result relation, and export it to the user
domain. The update pipeline allows subjects executing in special data input domain to
prepare records for input to the DBMS, identify records to delete, and transforms them
into a data type readable by the DBMS domain. The metadata pipeline provides the
mechanisms for defining a database structure, specifying relations, views, attributes,
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classifications, and would nonnally be restricted to access by a database administrator
[Haig, 91] .
LDV Data Distribution: The multilevel secure relation is distributed across
LOCK data files by assigning a set of files per security level, there is no replication of
data across files. The Update Pipeline deterrn.ines the appropriate assignment of data to
files by examining several classification constraints (Context constraints are rules that
refer to combination of data items). Each security level of the MLS relatton is stored in
a separate file, each file contains the partial relation visible at the level of that file or
higher. Each attribute involved in by context constraints is placed in a separate file.
The partial relation for the view at any given level is computed from the data stored at
that level and from lower level data using the MERGE [ Haig, 91].
Reconstruction of a Multilevel secure relation: The query processor ( The
Response pipeline is the query processor for LDV) reconstructs a partial relation
representing a user view from the data distributed across files. There is one partial
relation corresponding to each base relation in the user's query. The remaining query
processing such as JOIN is perfonned using these partial relations[ Stac, 90].
The query processor merge tuples from different files with the same primary key to
reconstruct a partial relation at a particular level. The reconstruction is performed in
two steps. 1) the partial tuples are retrieved, based upon the query, the level of the user,
and the attribute classification constraints, 2) an operator called MERGE is used,
MERGE works with the knowledge of the properties of the tuples in the different
partitions of a relation [ Stac,90].
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The major advantage of LDV is that LOCK enforces its security policy on data stor~d
in operating system files which reduce the amount oftrosted code in the database
systems that are responsible for enforcing security. However, the major disadvantage of
LDV data distribution is the performance penalty for retrieval requests for the recovery
procedure. The reconstruction process required costly merge and join operations
which slow down the performance. The LOCK security policy is incomplete in dealing
with DBMS security because of its operating system orientation [Silv, 95].
MLR Data Model
MLR [Chen, 95] is a multilevel secure relational data model that supports
classification labels for both elements and tuples. It has five operation statements and
five integrity properties for manipulating MLS relations. It combines several ideas
from other security models such as SeaView and LOCK Data View models. Chen and
Sandhu [ Chen, 95] have redefined many concepts and introduced several new ones
The major difference is the requirement that there can be at most one tuple in each
access class for a given entity; this gives the simplicity for converting the MLR model to
tuple-labeling data model.
MLR model took Entity Integrity and Foreign Key Intef,Tfity from original SeaView
model [ lunt,88] and redefined Referential and Polyinstantiation Integrity; moreover, it
introduced Data-Borrow integrity. Polyinstantiation Integrity in MLR model is more
general than SeaView model, that is, it takes care of both element polyinstantiation and
entity polyinstantiation while SeaView model only applied entity polyinstantiation
[Chen, 95].
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Polyinstantiation integrity constraints (PI) have been required by several models;
The following model is similar to the one proposed by SeaView except for the first
requirement. Chen and Sandhu [Chen,95] defined P[ as: An instance Rc of a
multilevel secure relation R satisfies polyinstantiation integrity if and only if for 1~ i ~ n
a) AI, TC -7 Ci
b)Al, Cl, Ci -7 Ai
Al, Ai: attributes in relation R, Cl, Ci, : classification level for AI, Ai.
TC: Tuple level classification, TC = Lub {Cl, C2,... , Cn}.
The second requirement is the same as the polyinstantiation integrity constraints in
SeaView model, while the first requirement says that every entity in a relation can have
at most one tuple for every access class [ Chen, 95].
Data-Borrow Integrity Constraints (DB1) is a major constraints in MLR because
it ensures that changes to data at a lower I.evels can be automatically propagated to
higher levels [ Chen, 95]. The Data-Borrow inte!:,rrity constraints is: An instance Rc of
a multilevel secure relation R satisfies Data-Borrow integrity:
if and only if for all t E Rc and
I ~ i ~ n, if trAil :j; null 1\ t [ei] < t[TC], there exists l' E Rc such that
t'[AI,CI] = [Al,Cl] 1\ 1'[TC] = t'[Ci] = t[Ci] 1\ t'[Ai] = t[Ai] [Chen, 95].
t, l' : tuples in relation R
The following example is borrowed from Pernul model to explain the Data-Borrow
Integrity [Chen, 95] :
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Let R1 and R2 be two relation instances:
Ship Name Cl Objective C2 Destination C3 TC
Ml C Discovery C Jerusalem S S
Ml C Discovery C Amman C C
R 1 : relation instance
Ship Name Cl Objective C2 Destination C3 TC
Ml C Discovery C Jerusalem S S
R2 : relation instance
Rl satisfies Data-Borrow integrity while R2 dose not satisfies DBI. Here in Rl DBI
requires that C-tuple must exist. This is because absence of C-tuple means that to C-
subject the entity M1 dose not exist; which implies that C-subject can not access
C-tuple [Chen, 95].
The Referential Integrity in MLR model is similar to referential integrity in
SeaView model except for the third condition in page 24 which states that in SeaView
tl[FKc] ~ t2[pKc] while in rvfLR t1[FKc] = t2 [pKc].
SeaView allows downward references that is the foreign key calls all tuples in
referencing relation which their security level greater than security level of the primary
key of referenced relation. On the other hand, MLR does not allow dovmward references
[Chen, 95].
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MLR model has five manipulation statement. Four of them are the conventional SQL
statements ofINSERT, SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE. Chen and Sandhu [Chen,95]
redefines the semantics of the four standard SQL statements and introduced the fifth
statement which is UPLEVEL to create a tuple whose contents are borrowed from other
tuples and insert it in the relation.
Decomposition Technique in MLR: A multilevel secure relation
R (A1,C 1,A2,C2,... ,An,Cn,TC) can be decomposed to several tuple-level labeling
relations [Chen, 95]:
1) Rl(AI,Eid,Cl)
2) R2 (Eid,E12, ... ,Eln,TC)
3) R3k (Elk,Eid,Ak,Ck)
R 1, R2, R3k are single level base relations that store the decomposed MLS relation.
Eid is an entity identification, El 1,... ,Elk are element identifications, Ak is attribute value
and Ck is classification of Ak [Chen, 95]. The multilevel secure relation is reconstructed
by perfonning several join operations.
MLR Model combines several ideas from SeaView and LOV models, redefines
others, and finally introduced new ones that simplifY the Database security model. MLR
improve the Polyinstantiation and referential integrity which removes the ambiguity
from the database security model. However, the disadvantage of MLR is that the
reconstruction of a multilevel secure relation requires several join operations, and the
join operations are expensive and lead to bad perfonnance.
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PerDul Model
Pemul model [Pem, 91] is a multil.evel secure relational data model that is not fully
based on Bell-LaPadula model but is fully based on views. Pemul model supports
mandatory access control; that is restricts access to classified information to cleared
personnel. Fragments and views are the granularity of data to which we provide
automated security labeling. Views are the only user interface to the users and users
access only data that is contained in the user's view [Pem, 91].
Decomposition Technique: Decomposition in Pemul model is based on the
definition of isolated and overlapping views. Pemul [ Pem,91] defines several notations
that forms the basis of the model and those notations are necessary to understand the
model:
View : A view is a virtual table that is derived from other tables, the view forms the area
of the database the user is allowed to access, it has been considered as a object
for access control [ Qian, 96a].
RS (AI, A2,... , An): A relation schema RS is a set of attributes {A 1,... ,An}, each
attribute has a domain. The relation schema is used to describe a relation R.
R : A relation R of relation schema RS is a set of distinct tuples {t1 ,... ,tn} of the form
<a] ,... ,an> where ai is a withi.n the domain of Ai.
Vertical fragmentation: is the projection ofa relational schema RS into subsets of Its
attributes called fragments.
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Horizonlal fragm~ntation: IS panitionlng a relational schc:ma RS into disJoint fragmc:nts
based on a pr~dlcate defined on RS The predicate is a Boolean combma!ion of-
tenns, each term is a comparison that can be true or false.
Derived hOrlzontal fragmentation is partitioning a relational schema RSI by applying
to it the same panitioning criterion as appl ied to RSJ
Pemul [Pem, 91] decomposes a relation R into a set of disjoint fragments by
perfonning the follo\\lng procedure. First finds all the overlapping and isolated views,
second, for each pair of the overlapping views performs a vertical, horizontal, and
derived horizontal decomposition, and finally performs a vertical, horizontal, and derived
horizontal decomposition for each paJr of the isolate views. ft is recommended that the
vertical decomposition should be perfonned before the horizontal decomposition to
minimize the number of fragments [Pem, 91].
The following example is borrowed from Pemul model [Pem, 91 J to show the
relation between views and fragments. FIgure) shows the original relation with five
vie\vs and figure ~ shows the decomposed relation with seven fragments. for example,
vie\v Y3 is stored as fragment FI and F3, YS is stored as F6 and F7.
."
b:SJ V2 \Z2l V3 !If.~;!:q V4
Disease
~V5L:.::d
"Figure 1: Start Schema of the Hospital Database" [pem, 91)
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" Figure 2 : Decomposition of the hospital database" (Fern, 91 J
The multilevel secure relation is reconstructed by appending horizontal fragments to
create larger horizontal fragment and concatenating the vertical fragments. The join
operations are only performed if the view combine two relations[Pem. 91].
Pemul model provides protection to database fragments and user vie\vs through
security labels, it also provjdes a methodology for automated labelJng of security objects
and subject, and finally it supports reassignment of clearance levels to users[Pem, 91].
Fragments are the security objects of the database and represent the granularity level
of dara to which the classification labels are assigned. Vlel,VS are the only interface of
the users to the database and are the security subject to which different levels of
clearances are assigned [Pem, 91]
Pemu] uses the cardinality functions card(aF~V) and card (d: F~V) as a \vay of
labeling which relate each fragment to the set of views accessing that fragment, and
different fragments to which views V have access. With regard to the example, a(FI) =
{ Vl,V2, V3} , a ( F4) = { VI}. The card ( a(FI)) = 3 ,and the card ( a(F4)) = ]. That is
fragment F 1 is accessed by views V I, V2, V3 while fragment F4 is accessed by only
view V1. At the other side, d(VI) = [ Fl, F2, F3, F4, FS, F6, F7) and d (V4) = [FS J, that
is view VI can access {Fl. F2, .. ,F7}, while view V4 can access only F5. Th~
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card (d (VI» = 7 and card (d(V4)) = 1. [Pem,95]
The ordering of fragments represents the sensitivity of information contained in the
fragments. Fragment F4 is accessed by one view only, it contains the most sensitive
information and the highest level of classification has to be assigned to this fragment.
On the other hand, view VI accesses the most fragments and should therefore have a
level of clearance that enables the users to access the corresponding fragments[ Pem, 91].
The reconstruction of a multilevel secure relation requires mostly concatenating and
appending operations and performed join operations only if view combines two
relations. The decomposition is lossless ( no spurious tuples) and avoid using repeated
join operations which are expensive. The major disadvantage is the limitation of the
model for specific organizations such as hospitals; in addition, Pemul model does not
support the discretionary access control which most security models support both
mandatory access control and discretionary access control[Pern, 9 I].
The Chinese Wall Lattice Model
The Chinese Wall policy that Brewer [Brew, 89] identifies arises in the segment of
the commercial sector that provides consulting services to other companies. The
Chinese lattice model [Sand, 93] design a lattice based access model for enforcing that
policy. The objective of this policy is to prevent information flows that result in a
conflict of interest for individual consultants.
Information flow is a key component oflattice models, A partially order set is said
to be a lattice if every two elements in the set have a unique least upper bound and a
unique greatest lower bound. A binary relation is said to be a partial ordering relation if
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it is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. Infonnation flow means flow of
infonnation from one security level to another. The infonnation is controlled by
assigning a security level for every object in the system. For example. A --> B means
infonnation can flow from A to B; while A ;f. > B means infonnation can not flow from
A to B [Folc, 96].
The Chinese Wall lattice Model [Sand, 93] prevents infonnation flows
that result in a conflict of interest for individual consultants. Company infonnation is
categorized in mutually disjoint conflict-of-interest classes, each company belongs to
one conflict of interest class, and the Chinese wall policy requires that a consultant not be
able to read information for more than one company in any given conflict-of-interest
class.
The Chinese Wall Lattice Security Policy: The clearance of a user is a high-water
mark that can float up the lattice but not down. A newly enrolled user in the system is
assigned [1-,1- ] (clean state), Now, by reading information about company 1 in conflict
of interest class l, the user clearance is modified to [1,1-], reading information about
company 2 in conflict-of -interest class 2, the user clearance is modified to [1,21- This
floating up of user's clearance is allowed as long as the clearance does not float up to
Syshigh. The floating up of a user's clearance corresponds with the ability to create
subjects with new labels for that user[Brew, 89].
This model is very useful when consultants deal with confidential company
information for their clients, and the consultant should not have access to information
about, say, two banks because such information creates a conflict of interest in the
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consultant's analysis. Insider information about two similar types of companies also
presents the potential for consultants to use such knowledge for personal profit.
However, the Major disadvantage is the limitation of that model, that it is only useful for
specific organizations and can not be modified to suite other security requirement for
different applications.
Novel Decomposition Technique
Jajodia and Sandhu (Jajo, 91a] designs a decomposition technique that decompose a
Multilevel Secure relation into single- level base relations using just borizontal
fragmentation. This is in contrast to the SeaView decomposition which is based on
vertical and horizontal fragmentation. The decomposition is based on the security level
of the tuple of the relation. The tuple security-level is calculated as the teast upper bound
of the classification of attributes.
All tuples with the same security class are grouped together to form a single relation
and then physically stored in the database The multilevel secure relation is reconstructed
by union operations. Since the decomposition doesn't require any vertical
fragmentation, it is possible to reconstruct the multilevel secure relation from the
underlying single level base relations without having to perform any join operations;
only union operations are required to be taken rJajo, 9 1l
Tbe major disadvantage of Novel technique is that the partition is large which
requires large I/O that degrade the performance. Another disadvantage of Novel is that
during update operations, Novel replicate the entire tuple when one attribute or more is
updated which increases the storage overhead.
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The Novel Decomposition Algorithm decomposes a multilevel secure relation into
single level base relations [Jajo, 91] :
The notations have been defined in page 11 in chapter 2.
Input: R (AI, CI, A2, C2, ... , An, Cn, TC).
Output: A collection of single-level secure base relations:
Rc (AI, CI, A2, C2, A3, C3, .. , An, Cn)
\;f c E {U, C, S, TS }
Create Rl,c (AI, Cl, A2, C2, ... , An, Cn)
END
The Novel Recovery Algorithm reconstructs a multilevel secure relation from its
single level base relations [Jajo, 91].
Input:
Output:
A collection of single-level secure base relations
A multilevel secure relation R where
R ( AI, CI, A2, C2, ... , An, Cn, TC).
Output: A multilevel secure relation R, R (AI, CI, A2, e2, ... , An, Cn, TC)
R = Rl,U U Rl,c U RI.s U Ri,TS
The Novel decomposition algorithm decomposes the MLS relation in table 1, page
13, into the following single level base relations.
EMPLOYEE (I NAME (2 JOB C3 BDATE (4 SALARY C5 TC
NUMBER
333 S OMER S JAi\I1TOR S 12-19-55 S $20,000 S S
666 S SONlA S SECRETA S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S S
444 S ALl S SALESMAN S 02-19-65 S $35,000 S S
Table 2 Rl. s
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E.\IPLOYEE (1 .'i."'.\IE C1 JOB CJ BOATE C~ SALARY C5
NUMBER
TC
555 S DAVID S MANAGER S 02-10-67 S $65,000 TS TS
333 S OMER S SPY TS 12-19-55 S 569,000 TS TS
666 TS lvnKE TS PRESfDENT TS 10-28-45 T5 599,000 TS TS
444 5 ALI S SPY T5 02-19-65 TS $75,000 TS TS
Table 3 R2, TS
The Novel recovery example, the Novel Recovery algorithm reconstructs
MLS relation R from its single level secure base relations by performing union
operation.
R = Rl,s U R2,TS
The result will be the original relation R in table I.
Integrity In l\:Iultilevel Secure Relational Database
Integrity and security are two of the most frequently heard concepts in the database
world. Secrecy refers to safety of data against unauthorized disclosure, and integrity
refers to accuracy of data. Preserving the accuracy of data is extremely important in any
database. In the relational model, preserving accuracy of data is achieved by the lise of
integrity constraints. Entity integrity, referential integrity, foreign key integrity, and
polyinstantiation integrity are four of the most important integrity constraints. They
apply to all relations and should be enforced by the database management systems [Lunt,
90).
Entity integrity guarantees a unique representation of each entity in the database
through specification of primary key attributes for each relation. Referential integrity
assures that if there exist any reference between two or more entities, then the related
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entities do exist in the database. Referential integrity is an inter-relation integrity
constraints and is achieved with the use of foreign attributes. Foreign key integrity
guarantees a unifonn classification for the attributes that belong to the foreign keys.
Polyinstantiation integrity specifies that there must never be two tuples with the same
primary key unless they represent polyinstantiated tuples or elements and controls the
effects ofpolyinstantantion [Sand, 92]. Before defining entity, referential, foreign key,
and polyinstantiation integrity constraints, it is necessary to define some variables that
will be used in this section. Furthennore, it is important to understand the concepts of
candidate key, primary key, and foreign key.
Ai : denotes the ith attribute in relation R, 1: a tuple E Rc
Ci : classification of attribute Ai, Cj: classification for the jth attribute.
ai : attribute i in instance Rc, ci classification of ith attribute in instance Rc
tc : tuple classification in Rc, Di : domain of ith element.
Rc : A relation instance, which is a set of distinct tuples ofthe form
(al,cl,a2,c2, ... ,an,cn,tc) where each ai E Oi or ai = null, c ~ ci and
tc = lub {ci : i=l,n}
Ric, R2c: relation instances.
AKc : classification for primary key, FKc : classification for foreign key
FK: Foreign key, AK: Primary key, tl : tuple ERIc, t2 : tuple E R2c
Candidate key: A candidate key of a relation R is a minimal set of attributes that serves
as the unique identifier for each tuple in relation R [Date, 90].
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Primary key: A primary key for a relation R is a candidate key of R. It is possible that a
relation R has more than one candidate key. in which case exactly one candidate key
must be chosen and designed as the pri mary key of R. The primary key of a relation
serves the purpose of selecting a specific tuple from the relation as well as linking tuples
from di fferent relations [ Date. 90].
Foreign Key: The definition of a foreign requires two relations, a referencing relation
R 1 and a referenced relation R2. Let PK denotes the primary key of R2, and let FK
denotes one or more attributes of the relation RI. FK is said to be a foreign key of R1
if given any tuple tl in RI, the following two requirements are met [Date. 901:
I) t[FK] is either wholly null or wholly non-null
2) Whenever tl[FK] is non null, there is a tuple t2 in R2 such that tl[FK] = t2[PK].
The entity integrity constraints states that no primary key value can be null. This is
because we use the primary key value to identify individual tuples in a relation; having
null values for the primary key implies that we cannot identify some tuples. For
example, if two or more tuples had null for their primary keys, we might not be able to
distinguish them [ Dosh, 92].
The Referential Integrity Constraint is a constraint that is specified between two
relations and is used to keep the consistency among tuples of the two relations. the
referential integrity constraints states that a tuple in one relation that refers to another
relation must refer to an exiting tuple in the relation [ Dosh, 92].
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Entity Integrity constraints in Multilevel secure relations: A multilevel relation
schema R is said to satisfy entity integrity if for all relation instances Rc of R and tuple t
E Rc:
I) if Ai E PK then trAil "# null, i.e., classification of primary key can not be null.
2) if Ai, Aj E PK, then t[Ci] = t[Cj] , i.e., PK is said to be unifonnly classified, and
3) if Ai tt PK then t [Ci] ~ t[C [PK)] where C[PK] is the classification of the apparent
primary key PK [ Lunt, 90l
Foreign Key Integrity Constraints: A multilevel secure relation schema R is said
to satisfy foreign key integrity constraints if it satisfies the following conditions:
1) Either (V AiEFK)[t[Ai]=null]OR (VAi EFK) [ t[Ai]"# null]
2) If Ai, Aj E FK then t[Ci] = t [Cj] [Lunt, 88].
The first condition states that all attributes belong to foreign key should be all null or
non of them should be null, The second condition states that the classification for all
attributes belong to the foreign key should be the same.
Referential integrity constraints in MLS relations: A multilevel relation schema R
is said to satisfy Referential intef,'Tity [Dosh, 92] if for all relation instances R Ie of R I,
R1c of R2 and tupletl E Rlc,t2 E R2c:
I) if I tIE RIc then tl [FK] "# null, foreign key classification can not be null.
2) if Ai, Aj E FK , then 11 [Ci] = t2[Q], FK is said to be uniformly classified.
3) tl [FKc] ~ t2[PKc] , i.e. the access class of the foreign key should always dominate
the access class of the primary key of the referenced tuple,
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4) t I[ FKc] = t2 rAKc] , the access class of the foreign key must be same as the
access class of the referenced pri mary key.
Polyinstantiation Integrity: Polyinstantiation is a natural consequence of a
multilevel secure relation. SeaView introduced the concept of polyinstantiation, by
which different versions of the same real-world entity ( for example, a person) can be
represented in the database, where the different versions represent what is known to users
at different clearance levels. Polyinstantiating has two fundamentals forms:
polyinstantiated tuples and polyinstantiated elements [ Sand, 90] .
Polyinstantiated tuples occurs when a relation contains multiple tuples with the
same primary key value, but having different access class values for the apparent
primary key. Polyinstantiated elements occurs when a relation contains two or more
tuples with identical primary key and the associated access class values, but having
different values for one or more remaining attributes [Sand, 90].
Polyinstantiated integrity constraints: Let AK be the apparent primary key of R. R
satisfies polyinstantion integrity if and only if for every Rc, we have for all Ai
AK, CNe, Ci ~ Ai
This constraints stipulates that the user-speci.fied apparent key AK, in c0l1junction




The New Decomposition Technique
During the past decade, there has been much interest in multilevel secure (MLS)
database management systems, and in particular MLS relational database models, This
has resulted in several MLS relational database models such as SeaView, LDV, and
Pernul model. Multilevel secure DBMSs are subject to a number of security-related
architectural and functional factors that affect perfonnance and storage overhead. These
factors include, among others, the distribution of data among security levels and how the
database is physically partitioned into files.
The current models concentrate on update semantics, design, and integrity issues
while ignoring performance and storage overhead which are the major parts of any
security model. Severa) designers deliberately sacrifice performance, and storage
requirements to achieve update semantics, design, and integrity issues.
After realizing the important of decomposition techniques and their role in
performance and storage requirements, few papers were published that study
decomposition techniques. SeaView model [Lunt, 90] decomposes a MLS relation into
36
single level base relations using horizontal and vertical fragmentation. The
reconstruction of the MLS relation from its single level base relations requires repeated
join operations, that is not only expensive but also results in an inefficient performance.
Novel decomposes a MLS relation using horizontal fragmentation, the reconstruction of
MLS relation requires union operations. The major problem with Novel technique is that
the partition is large which requires large I/O that degrade the performance. Another
disadvantage of Novel is that during update operations, Novel replicate the entire tuple
when one attribute or more is updated which increases the storage overhead. MLR as
well as LDV model have the performance penalty due to expensive join operations. The
major problem of Pernul and Chinese models is the limitation of those models for
specific organizations such as hospitals and consulting companies. Pernul and Chinese
models do not support discretionary access control which is a fundamental categories of
database security. As a result of the previous discussi.on I have designed a
decomposition technique that minimize the number ofjoin operations to one;
Furthennore, the partition size is relatively small compare to partition size in Novel
which minimize the storage requirement. On the other hand, the performance point of
view, the new technique is better than the other in regard of updating operations. [n this
chapter the new decomposition and new recovery algorithm is discussed and an
analytical comparison between the new technique and the existing ones is performed
based on Time and Space complexity.
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The New Decomposition Algorithm
The decomposition of a multilevel secure relation into single level base relations is
as follows:
Notations
R I,c and R2,c : base relations with classification c, c E { U, C, S, TS }.
R 1,c : Primary group base relations with classification c.
Ri,c : Attribute group base relations with classification c.
The other notations have been defined in page 11 in chapter 2.
Input: R (AI, Cl, A2, C2,... , An, Cn, TC).
Output: A collection of single-level secure base relations:
Rl,c (AI, CI, A2, C2, A3, C3 ... , A (r n/21) , C (r nl21l)
R2 ,c ( A 1, C 1 , A If nl2 l + 1) , C (I n/2 1 + 1) , A (I n/2 1 + 2) , C (I nl2 1 + 2) .., A(n), C(n) )
\:j C E { U, C, S, TS }
a) Create R I,c with = rn/2l attributes
V TC =c
For i = 2 to - rn/2l
Insert A (i) into R1.
End
b) Create R2,c with rn/2l attributes
V TC =c
For i = rn/2l + 1 to n




The New Recovery Algorithm:
The recovery algorithm of a multilevel secure relation from its single-level base
relations is as follows:
Notations:
Rl,c: (AI, Cl, A2, C2,... , A (InJ2h C(lnl21))
R2,c: (AI,Cl,A(rnl11+1),C(lnI11+1), ... ,An,Cn)
U: Union operation.
JOIN: Natural Join operation.
The other notations have been defined in page 22 in chapter 2.
Input = A collection of single level secure base relations.
Output: A multilevel secure relation R, R ( A 1, Cl, A2, C2,... , An, Cn, TC)
RI = Rl.u U Rl.c URI,s U RI.TS
R2 = RI,U U R2,c U R2,S U R2.TS
R = ( R I JOIN R2 )
The New Decomposition algorithm decomposes the MLS relation in table 1, page
13, into the following single level base relations
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EMPLOYEE NO CI l'<AME C2 J08 C3
333 S O;\{ER S JANITOR S
666 S SONTA S SECRETARY S
444 S ALI S SALESMAN S
Table 4 RI,s
EMPLOYEE NO. Cl BDATE C4 SALARY C5
333 S 12-99-55 S $20,000 S
666 S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S
444 S 02-19-65 S $35,000 S
Table 5 R2. s
EM:PLOYEE NO. CI NAlviE C2 JOB C3
555 S DAVID S rvfANAGER S
333 S OMER S SPY IS
666 IS MIKE IS PRESIDENT IS
444 S ALI S SPY IS
Table 6 Rl,TS
E1YfPLOYEE NO. Cl BDATE C4 SALARY C5
555 S 02-10-67 S $65,000 IS
333 S 12-19-55 S $69,000 IS
.666 IS 10-28-45 TS $99,000 IS
444 S 02-19-65 TS $75,000 IS
Table 7 R2.TS
The New recovery algorithm constructs the multilevel secure relation R from
i1s single level secure base relations by perfonning two union operation and only one
join operation.
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R 1 = R I sUR I,TS
EMPLOYEE CI NAME C2 JOB C3
NUMBER
555 S DAVID S MANAGER S
333 S OlvlER S Spy TS
333 S OlvlER S JANITOR S
666 IS MiKE IS PRESIDENT TS
666 S SONIA S SECRETARY S
444 S ALI S SPY TS
444 S ALI S SALESMAN S
RI
R2 = R2.s U R2.TS
EMJ>LOYEE Cl BDATE (4 SALARY C5
NUMBER
555 S 02-10-67 S $65,000 TS
333 S 12-19-55 S $69,000 TS
333 S 12-19-55 S $20,000 S
666 TS 10-28-45 TS $99,000 TS
666 S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S
444 S 02-19-65 TS $75,000 TS
444 S 01-20-60 S $35,000 S
R = Rl JOrN R2
The result will be the original relation R in table 1.
Discussion
In Chapter 2, SeaView, and Novel algorithms decompose a MLS relation R into
single level secure base relations, and reconstruct the M1JS relation from its single level
base relation. In the previous section, the New technique decomposes a MLS relation
into single level base relations and reconstructs it from its single level base relations.
The MLS relation R (table 1) has five attributes, seven tuples, and two security
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classification (S, TS). SeaView decomposes R into 10 small single level base relations,
Novel decomposes R into two large single level base relations, and the New technique
decomposes R into 4 moderate size single level base relations. SeaView requires five
union operations and five join operations to reconstruct MLS relation R, Novel
requires two union operations. On the other hand, the New technique requires only two
union operations and only 1 join operation.
The number ofjoin and union operations to reconstruct MLS in SeaView, and the
New technique depends on several factors: number of attributes and number of security
levels in the MLS relation. Assume R which is a MLS relation has N attributes and X
security levels, then SeaView requires N-l number of join operations and
N* ( X - t) union operation. On the other hand, the New technique requires one join
operation and (X - 1) * 2 union operations. That is the New technique requires less join
and union operations which means that the performance of the new technique is better
than SeaView model. That is New technique requires one join operation compares to
N-l join operation for SeaView, and (X-I) * 2 union operations for the New technique
compares to N* (X-J) union operations for SeaView. Another example, let R has 7
attributes and 4 security level, then N = 7, X = 4. SeaView requires 7-1 = 6 join
operations and the New technique requires one join operation. On the other hand,
SeaView requires 7* (4-1) = 21 union operations while the New technique requires
(4-]) * 2 = 6 union operations.
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l\-lultiJevel Secure Operations
Having defined the decomposition and recovery algorithms for the New technique
and the Novel technique shows how each technique works in decomposing MLS relation
into single level base relations, we now focus our attention on the operations available
for manipulating the information stored in the multilevel secure relation. The operations
that will be discussed are INSERT, DELETE, and UPDATE.
Table 1, table 4 through table 7 will be used in this section:
The following operations are used in the New decomposition technique.
A Secret user is issuing this command:
INSERT
INTO Rs
VALUES ("555", "]OHN"", "PROGRA1v11v1ER", "01-25-70", "$40,000")
First, the database director guarantees that the primary key classification does not
contain any null value. Second, for all tuples belong to Rc , the new primary key does
not exist in that relation.
The new tuple is added to table 4 and table 5 and the new base relation is
EMPLOYEE NO. Cl NAME C2 JOB C3
333 S oMER S JANITOR S
666 S SONIA S SECRETARY S
555 S JOHJ"J S PROGRfuV1MER S
444 S ALI S SALESMA1'J S
Table 8 Rl,s
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E.\1PLOYEE :-;0 CI BOATE C4 SALARY C5
333 S 12-99-55 S $20,000 S
666 S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S
555 S 01-25-70 S $40,000 S
444 S 02-19-65 S $35,000 S
Table 9 R2, s
A Secret user is issuing this command:
UPDATE
SET SALARY = " $25,000"
WHERE EMPLOYEE NO. = 333.
Table 9 will be changed to the following base relation
EMPLOYEE NO. CI BOATE C4 SALARY C5
333 S 12-99-55 S $25,000 S
666 S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S
555 S 01-25-70 S $40,000 S
444 S 02-19-65 S $35,000 S
Table 10 R2. s
A Secret user is issuing the following command:
UPDATE Rs
SET JOB = " SALESMANAGER"
WHERE E1v1PLOYEE NO. = "444"
Table 8 will be changed
EMPLOYEE NO Cl NMvfE C2 JOB C3
,~~ S OMER S JANITOR S.l.>'>
666 S SONIA S SECRETARY S
555 S JOH:N" S PROGRAMMER S
1 444 S AU S SALESMANAGER S
Table 11 Rl. s
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A Top Secret user is issuing this command
UPDATE Rrs
SET SALARY =" $85,000"
WHERE EMPLOYEE NO. =" 444"
Table 7 will be changed:
E1\-f1>LOYEE NO. Cl BDATE C4 SALARY C5
555 S 02-10-67 S $65,000
TS
333 S 12-19-55 S $69,000
TS
666 TS 10-28-45 TS $99,000 TS
444 S 02-19-65 TS $85,000 TS
Table 12 R2.TS
A Top Secret user issues this command
UPDATE Rs
SET JOB = " SUPERVISOR"
WHERE EMPLOYEE NO. = "555"
Since a Top Secret is updating a secret base relation, a new tuple is created and added
to Table 6 That is one of the major difference between the new technique and Novel,
because Novel will create a new tuple with six attributes while the new technique create
a tuple with three attributes only, several examples will discuss the update procedure in
Novel later in this section.
The new base relation IS
ENfPLOYEE NO CI NAME C2 JOB C3
555 S DAVID S MANAGER S
333 S OMER S SPY TS
666 TS MIKE TS PRESIDENT TS
555 S JOHN S SUPERVISOR TS
444 S ALI S Spy TS
Table 13 Rl, TS
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Table 10 and Table II will lose one tuple each, so the new relations are:
E~1PLOYEENO. CI NAME C2 JOB C3
333 S oMER S JANlTOR S
666 S SONIA S SECRETARY S
555 S JOHN S PROGRAMMER S
Table 14 Rl.s
EMPLOYEE NO. Cl BDATE C4 SALARY C5
333 S 12-99-55 S $25.000 S
666 S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S
555 S 01-25-70 S $40,000 S
Table i5 R2. s
The followmg operations are used in Novel decomposition technique:
Table 1 through Table 3 are used in this section:
A Secret user is issuing this command:
fNSERT
INTO Rs
VALUES ( «999", "ALEX", " TEACHER", "02-15-50", "$22,000" )
Table 1 will be changed:
EMPLOYEE (I NAJvfE C2 ' JOB C3 BDATE C4 SALARY C5 TC
NUMBER
333 S OlvfER S JANITOR S 12-19-55 S $20,000 S S
666 S SONIA S SECRETARY S 05-05-48 S $28,000 S S
444 S ALI S SALESMAN S 02-19-65 S $35,000 S S
999 S ALEX S TEACHER S 02-15-50 S $22,000 S S
Table 16 R!.s
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A Top Secret user issues this command
DELETE
FROM RTS
WHERE EMPLOYEE = "666"
Table 3 will lose one tuple whose primary key is 666, the new relation is:
EMPLOYEE CI NAME C2 JOB C3 BDATE C4 SALARY C5 TC
NlJMBER
555 S DAVID S MA.'\jAGER S 02-10-67 S S65,OOO TS TS
333 S OMER S Spy TS 12-]9-55 S $69.000 TS TS
444 S ALI S Spy TS 02-19-65 TS $75,000 TS TS
Table 17 R2, TS
A Top Secret user issues this command
UPDATE Rs
SET JOB = <; SUPERVlSOR"
WHERE EMYLOYEE NO. = "999"
In Novel, when one attribute is updated by a higher level, a new tuple is created and
inserted in the high level relation. Table 17 will be changed and the new relation is:
EMPLOYEE Cl NAME C2 JOB C3 BDATE C4 SALARY C5 TC
NUMBER
555 S DAVID S MA.!"lAGER S 02-10-67 S 565,000 TS TS
333 S OMER S SPY TS 12-19-55 S 569,000 TS TS
444 S ALI S SPY TS 02-J 9-65 TS 575,000 TS TS
999 TS AlEX TS SlJPERVISOR T S 02-15-50 TS 522.000 TS TS
Table ] 7 R2, TS
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Discussion
In the previous section several multilevel SQL operations have been used in both the
New technique and the Novel technique. The examples shows that INSERT and
DELETE operations have the same effect on the single level base relations. On the other
hand, the major different is in the UPDATE operation. In Novel, updating one attribute
or more in any tuple by a high level user requires the duplication of the entire tuple and
inserting it in the high single level base relation. In the New technique, updating one or
two attributes requires duplicating 50 percent of attributes and inserting them in the
high single level base relation. Replicating the entire tuple in Novel increase the
storage overhead and increases the partition size which degrade the performance.
Storage requirements ( Space Complexity)
The storage requirement is the amount of storage required to store a relation. In thiS
thesis is the amount of storage in bytes required to store the single level base relations.
The storage requirements can be calculated by using equations to find how many bytes it
requires to store the MLS relation after the decomposition procedure in both the New and
the Novel technique. The reason for the calculation is to perform a comparison between
the New decomposition technique and the Novel technique and finds out which one
requires less storage.
The following notations will be used in this section:
Du, Dc, Os, Dts: tuples created by unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret users
P: Probability of a tuple to be updated by a high level user.
ex : The size of primary key di vided by the size of non-key attribute.
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S : Size of attribute A in bytes.
N : Number of attributes in relation R.
Stn: Storage requirements of relation R using Novel Technique.
Sts: Storage requirements of relation R using SeaView Technique.
Stnt 1: Storage requirements of relation R using New Technique 1.
Stnt2: Storage requirements ofrelation R using New Technique 2.
The storage requirements can be measured by modifying equation 1 [Mukk, 94] to
make it suitable for the new technique.
Stn = S *(N+2*a) *[ Du+Dc+Ds+Dts) + P *(3Du+2Dc+Ds)] . (1)
In equation 1 : N, Du, Dc, Ds, Dts, a are constant and therefore, the equation is a
function of P. In equation 1, Mr. Mukkamala [Mukk, 94] multiply a by two because his
technique requires storage for two primary keys for each tuple, one for the primary key
in the partitions and the other for the primary key stored in the index file.
Since the new technique requires storage for three primary keys for each tuple
(one in the index file, and two in the partitions that store the tuple), we multiply a by
three. We have two new equations that apply to the new technique based on number of
at1ributes updated; when the number of attributes updated are less than 50% equation 2
will be used, when number of attributes updated are more than 50%, equation 3 will be
used.
Stnl = S *(N+3*a) *[ Du+Dc+Ds+Dts) + (Pf2) *(3Du+2Dc+Ds)].
Stn2 = S *(N+3*a) *[ Du+Dc+Ds+Dts) + P *(3Du+2Dc+Ds)] . (3 )
(2)
Example:
The following example is borrowed from [Mukk, 94] to show the storage
requirements between the new technique and the Novel technique.
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Let S = 20, N= 10, a = 0.5, Du=4, Dc=3, ds=2, Dts=1.
Sto= 20 *(10+2*0.5) * (4+3+2+1) + P (3*4+2*3+2)]
= 20 *(11) * [10+20* P]
= 2200 + 4400 * P
Stnt1 = 20 * (10 + 3* 0.5) * [(4+3+2+1) + (P/OS) * (3*4+2*3+2)]
= 20 * (11.5) * [ 10 + (P/O.S) * 20]
(4)
= 2300 + 2300* P
Stnt2 = 20 * (10 + 3* 0.5) * [(4+3+2+ 1) + P * (3*4+2*3+2)]
= 20 * (ll.S) * [ 10 + P * 20 ]
= 2300 + 4600 * P
(5)
(6)
Proba bility Novel Technique
P Stn = 2200 + 4400 * P
P=l Stn = 2200 + 4400* 1
=6600
p= .09 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.9
= 6160
P = .08 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.8
= 5720
P = .07 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.7
= 5280
p= .06 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.6
=4840
P = .05 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.5
=4400
P = .04 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.4
= 3960
P = .03 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.3
= 3520
P = .02 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.2
= 3080
P=.OI Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.1
= 2640
P = 0.0 Stn = 2200 + 4400*0 0
= 2200
New Technique 1
Stnt 1 = 2300 + 2300 * P
Stnt1 = 2300 + 2300 * 1
=4600
Stnt 1 = 2300 + 2'"'00 * O.q
= 4370
Sintl = 2300 + 2300 * 0.8
= 4140
Stntl = 2300 2300 + 0.7
= 3900
Stnt 1 = 2300 + 2300 + 0.6
= 3680
Stnt1 = 2300 + 2300 * 0.5
= 3450
Stnt 1 = 2300 + 2300 * 0.4
= 3220
Stotl = 2300 + 2300 * 0.3
= 2990
Stnt1 = 2300 + 2300 * 0.2
= 2760
Stnt 1 = 2300 + 2300 * 0.1
= 2530
Stnt] = 2300 + 2300 * 0.0
= 2300
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The difference in storage requirements of Novel and the New technique is expressed
as the percentage difference % t:. S, where %t:. S represent the percentage increase or
decrease in storage requirements when one switch from Novel to New technique.
% t:. S = (Storage for Novel - Storage for New Technique_I) * 100/ Storage for Novel
% t:. S = ( Stn - Stntl) * 100 / Stn
P = 1, % t:. S = ( 6600 - 4600) * 100/6600 = 30.30%
P = 0.9, %t:. S = (6160 - 4370) * 100/6160 = 29.05%
P = 0.8, %t:. S = ( 5720 - 4140) * 100/5720 = 27.62%
P = 0.7, %t:. S = ( 5280 - 3900) * 100/5280 = 26.14%
P = 0.6, %t:. S = ( 4840 - 3680) * 100/4840 = 23.97%
P = 0.5, %t:. S = ( 4400 - 3450) * 100/4400 = 21.60%
P=OA, %t:.S=(3960-3220)* 100/3960 = 1867%
P = 0.3, %t:. S = (3520 - 2990) * 100/3520 = 15.06%
P = 0.2, %t:. S = ( 3080 - 2760) '" 100/3080 = 10.39%
P = 0.1, %t:. S = (2640 - 2530) * 100/2640 = 4.17%
P = 0.0, %t:. S = ( 2200 - 2300) * 100/2200 = -455%
Figure 3 ( page 51 ) shows a comparison between % f.\ S and the probability of
update P.When the probability of update is more than 0.1, Novel requires more storage
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Pjk: Probability with which a tuple originally created by a j-user is likely to be updated by a k-user.
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than New technique; furthennore, the percentage dLfTerence Lncreases by the increase of
probability of update. That is the ew technique requires less storage than Novel
technique.
On the other hand, the worst case of the new technLque is that when more than 50% of
attributes are updated, then equation Stnt2 will be used.
Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * P





Stn = 2200 + 4400 * P Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * P
Stn = 2200 + 4400* 1 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * I
= 6600 = 6900
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.9 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0 9
= 6160 = 6440
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.8 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.8
= 5720 = 5980
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.7 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.7
= 5280 = 5520
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.6 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.6
= 4840 = 5060
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.5 Stnt2 = 2300 I 4600 * 0.5
= 4400 = 4600
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.4 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.4
= 3960 = 4140
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.3 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.3
= 3520 = 3680
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.2 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.2
= 3080 = 3220
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.1 Stnt2 = 2300 I 4600 * 0 I
= 2640 = 2760
Stn = 2200 + 4400*0.0 Stnt2 = 2300 + 4600 * 0.0
= 2200 = 2300









requirements when one switch from Novel to New technique.
% ~ S = (Storage for Novel - Storage for New Technique 2) * 100 I Storage for Novel
% ~ S = ( Stn - Stnt2) * 100 I Stn
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P = 1, % 11 S = ( 6600 - 6900) * 100/6600 = -4.545%
P = 0.9, %L\ S = (6160 - 6440) * 100/6160 = -4.545%
P = 0.8, %L\ S = ( 5720 - 5980) * 100/5720 = -4.545%
P = 0.7, %L\ S = ( 5280 - 5520) * 100/5280 = -4.545%
P = 0.6, %L\ S = ( 4840 - 5060) * 100/4840 = -4.545%
P = 0.5, %11 S = ( 4400 - 4600) * 100/4400 = -4.545%
P = 0.4, %L\ S = (3960 - 4140) * 100/3960 = -4.545%
P = 0.3, %L\ S = ( 3520 - 3680) * 100/3520 = -4.545%
P = 0.2, %L\ S = ( 3080 - 3220) * 100/3080 = -4.545%
P = 0.1, %L\ S = (2640 - 2760) * 100/2640 = -4.545%
P = 0.0, %L\ S = ( 2200 - 2300) * 100 / 2200 = -4.545%
Figure 4 (page 55) shows a comparison between % L\ S and the probability of
update P, Figure 4 shows that the difference is constant regardless the value of
probability of update, the percentage difference is -4.545%, that is Novel requires less
storage than the New technique. This is the worst case in the New technique.
Cost of Reconstruction ( Time Complexity)
The cost of reconstruction is measured in terms of the I/O cost of reading and writing
the required partitions from the database. The I/O cost involved the sizes of the
partitions and the size of the main memory. We assume that we have sufficient main
memory to store the intennediate relations of the join operations. The I/O cost is also
measured in terms of number ofjoin and other operations involved in the decomposition
and the creation of the partitions and the relations [Mukk, 94].
Since the cost ofreconstruction depends on the cost of replication of the primary key
and the cost of attribute key replication, it follows the same as the storage requirements,
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Pjk: Probability with which a tuple originally created by a j-user is likely to be updated by a k·user.
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cost of join operations have h~en discussed in detailed in the pre ious section. SeaView
requires several join operations to reconstruct a multilevel secure relation from its single
level base relations while the New technique requires only one join operation. For
example, assume R has 6 attributes and 3 security level, then SeaView requires 5 join
operations and 12 union operations. On the other hand, the New technique requires only
one join operation and 4 union operations. That is the New technique requires less time





A multilevel secure system is a system where each data item is assigned a security
classification and every user a security clearance. The role of a multilevel secure
database management system is to ensure that users manipul.ate only those data to which
their clearance entitles them .. The multilevel secure relations are decomposed into a
collection of single level base relations which are physically stored in the database. The
primary advantage of the decomposition is to enforce mandatory controls with respect to
single level base relations by Trusted Computi ng Base (TCB), a small part of the
operating system that must always be invoked, and must be shown to perfoTITl only its
intended functions. The TCB is responsible for enforcing mandatory controls with
respect to single-level base relation. A new decomposition technique was developed to
improve performance and storage requirements for MLS database systems.
The first part of these thesis focus on the design issues of several security models.
This is followed by a detailed study of database security models by analyzing those
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models and pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of each security models. The
second part of this thesis analyze multilevel secure relational database security and all
relevant subjects such as integrity constraints and polyinstantiation. The third part is
developing a new decomposing technique that decompose a multilevel secure relation
into single level base relations to be stored in the database. The fourth part is developing
a recovery algorithm that recover the MLS relation from its single level base relations.
And finally the fifth part is performing a comparison between the new technique and the
exiting techniques based on space and time complexity.
Decomposition and Recovery techniques are fundamental issues of any security
models, and these techniques are important in improving performance and storage
requirement for any model. Therefore, I have studied the previous decomposition
techniques and develop a new technique that improve both performance and storage
requirements.
The new decomposition technique minimizes the time required to create a MLS
secure relation from Its single level base relations; therefore, it improves the performance
of the system, performance i.ssues has been scarified during designing ofsecurily
models. The new technique has improved in general the storage requirement in
comparison to other decomposition techniques because it doesn't duplicate the primary
keys in each partition as in SeaView model which waste an enormous amount of storage.
The main focus of this research has been to develop a new decomposition and
recovery algorithm for decomposing and recovering a MLS relation. A theoretical
approach has been designed and an implementation of those techniques using a real
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world relational database environment is a logical follow-up to this work. Although I
have studied integrity in detail security can be severely compromised by inference
attacks. An inference attack occurs when a user can infer unauthorized information
from a priori knowledge about the database and authorized query responses rSand, 931-
It is therefore important to conduct a detailed investigation in inference-control.
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